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Designing New Money 
- The Policy Trilemma of Central Bank Digital Currency 
 
 
Abstract: 
The prospect of central banks issuing digital currency (CBDC) immediately rais-
es the question of how this new form of money should co-exist and interact with 
existing forms of money. This paper evaluates three different scenarios for the 
implementation of CBDC in terms of their monetary policy implications. In the 
‘money user scenario’ CBDC co-exists with both cash and commercial bank de-
posits. In the ‘money manager scenario’ cash is abolished and CBDC co-exists 
only with commercial bank deposits. And in the ‘money maker scenario’ commer-
cial bank deposits are abolished and CBDC co-exist only with cash. The evalua-
tion is based on an adaption of the classical international monetary policy tri-
lemma to a domestic monetary system with multiple forms of money. Our propo-
sition is that a monetary system with two competing money creators, the central 
bank and the commercial banking sector, can simultaneously only pursue two out 
of the following three policy objectives: Free convertibility between CBDC and 
bank money, parity between CBDC and bank money, and central bank monetary 
sovereignty, which is the use of monetary policy for anything else than support 
for commercial bank credit creation. This means that the decision on the design 
of a monetary system with CBDC implies a crucial political decision on the prior-
ities of the central bank. 
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Executive Summary 
The prospect of central banks issuing digital currency not only raises the ques-
tion of whether this is a good idea or not. There are a number of variables in the 
design of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) thus raising the question how 
to design such a new form of money. This is the question explored in this paper. 
The paper poses the question of the design of CBDC not merely as a technical 
but also a political question. Before we are able to determine, what is the optimal 
design of CBDC, we have to decide, what we want this kind of money to do for 
us. What is the purpose of implementing CBDC? This is a political question in so 
far as different CBDC design models serve the interest of different groups of 
agents in the economy. The purpose of the paper is to point out the political na-
ture of the question of CBDC as well as to map out different scenarios for the 
design and implementation of this kind of money. 
 
Old Money and New Money 
The paper defines CBDC in relation to the three kinds of money constituting 
the existing monetary system: cash, bank money and central bank reserves. The 
characteristics of these three kinds of money relative to CBDC are analyzed 
through the Venn diagram below. 
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The idea is that each of the existing forms of money is defined through the 
lack of one of the three features: electronic, universal and central bank issued. 
The illustration also shows how CBDC integrates all of these three features. 
CBDC thus potentially competes with each of the three existing forms of money. 
This allows us to pose the question of the design of CBDC in terms of the way 
that CBDC should supplement or replace any of the existing forms of money. 
Assuming that CBDC replaces existing central bank reserve money, the issue of 
the design of CBDC may be broken down into two key questions: 
- Should cash be abolished with the implementation of CBDC or should the 
two forms of money co-exist? 
- Should bank money be abolished with the implementation of CBDC or 
should the two forms of money co-exist? 
Depending on the way that these two questions are answered, there are four 
different ways of combining CBDC with existing money each constituting a par-
ticular design model of the monetary system: 
1) CBDC as complimentary to both cash and bank money 
2) CBDC as a replacement for cash and complimentary to bank money 
3) CBDC as a replacement for both cash and bank money 
4) CBCD as complimentary to cash and a replacement for bank money. 
The monetary policy implications of model 3) and 4) are not considered to dif-
fer significantly and they are thus treated as one model. 
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The Policy Trilemma of CBDC 
In order to evaluate the policy implications of each of these three design mod-
els, the paper develops an adapted version of Mundell, Fleming and Obstfeld's 
classic monetary policy trilemma. The conventional trilemma illustrates the rela-
tions between a domestic and a foreign money creator in the form of two differ-
ent central banks. Our trilemma illustrates the relations between two domestic 
money creators in the form of the central bank and the commercial banking sec-
tor. The domestic monetary policy trilemma is posed in the following fashion: 
 
 
- The conventional policy objective of exchange rate management between 
two currencies translates into the domestic policy objective of securing financial 
stability by maintaining parity between commercial bank money on the one 
hand and CBDC and cash on the other. 
- The conventional policy objective of monetary autonomy in decisions on 
central bank interest rates translates into monetary sovereignty, which is the 
prerogative of the monetary authorities to use CBDC not only as a monetary 
policy tool to support commercial bank credit creation but also as a fiscal policy 
tool to stimulate the general economy. The abandonment of monetary sovereign-
ty means that commercial banks are the primary drivers of money creation.  
- The conventional policy objective of free capital mobility translates into 
free convertibility between commercial bank money and central bank money. 
We may understand the implementation of CBDC as the introduction of such 
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convertibility. With universal access to the central bank balance sheet, ordinary 
money users now for the first time have the option to choose between holding 
electronic money with the central bank or with commercial banks. 
The gist of the trilemma is that monetary authorities can only pursue two out 
of the three policy objectives. 
 
Three Scenarios 
 The main analytical section of the paper applies the domestic monetary poli-
cy trilemma to each of the three possible CBDC design models. The current situ-
ation, where convertibility between commercial bank money and central bank 
money is highly inconvenient for money users as they would have to hold physi-
cal cash, means that the monetary authorities are now in the (C) position. The 
introduction of CBDC opens up the possibility of free convertibility between 
commercial bank money and central bank money. This means that the central 
bank must either give up using monetary policy and interest rate adjustments for 
any other purpose than defending parity (A). Such approach would immediately 
correspond to design model (1). But pressure on parity could ultimately force the 
central bank to phase out cash to allow for CBDC interest rates going negative 
thus leading to design model (2). Another option is for the central bank to give 
up taking responsibility for parity between CBDC and bank money (B). This 
would amount to design model (3) or (4) as bank credit money would no longer 
have the status of money but be merely a particular form of commercial credit. 
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Introduction 
From Monetary Policy to Monetary Politics 
One of the great questions of counterfactual history is this: What would the 
world look like today, if John Maynard Keynes' proposal for a Bancor had been 
adopted at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference? The Bretton Woods system 
came to define the exceptional role of the United States in the global economy by 
establishing the US-Dollar as the anchor of the international monetary order thus 
making it the new world reserve currency. In contrast to this model, Keynes had 
envisaged a truly supranational currency in the form of the Bancor, which would 
be beyond the control of any single state and thus put all of the national curren-
cies on an equal footing. Thinking through the hypothetical scenario of an adop-
tion of the Bancor proposal brings to mind the real economic and political signif-
icance of an initially technical difference in the design of a monetary system. The 
technical design of the Bretton Woods was constitutive for the post-war economic 
world order. 
The topic of the current paper is the proposal of implementing central bank 
issued digital currency (CBDC). Hiding behind the inconspicuous acronym 
CBDC is nothing short of an entirely new form of money. While the true poten-
tial of such an arrangement may not be immediately evident to the non-expert 
eye, it could nevertheless constitute a radical innovation in the constitution of 
our money system in the same category as the introduction of paper money. As 
in the case of the Bancor and the Bretton Woods, it is crucial to understand how 
technical differences in the design of CBDC has profound economic and political 
implications, when this new money is implemented. The purpose of the paper is 
to bridge the technical dimensions with the economic and political dimensions of 
the question of CBDC. 
 In the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007-8, there was a win-
dow of opportunity for financial reform. Banks and private financial institutions 
were on their knees. They were in need of liquidity to prevent money markets 
from freezing, assets prices from deflating and themselves from going into insol-
vency. Governments and regulatory bodies could have used this opportunity to 
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impose reforms on the banking sector not only to create a more stable system but 
also take back some of the control over the economy and society, which had been 
concentrated in the financial sector over the past four decades of increasing fi-
nancialization. 
Instead of exploiting this opportunity for change, the general trend in the re-
sponses from governments of the economies struck by crisis was to aim for a res-
toration of status quo. The first priority was to bail out the banks by using the 
central banks as providers of ample amounts of cheap money as well as sinks to 
offload toxic assets. These state subsidies to the banks were presented as inevita-
ble technocratic measures and their true content obscured under acronyms such 
as TARP and QE. Not only did they serve to reboot the balance sheets of pri-
vate financial corporations and allow them to swiftly return to pre-crisis levels of 
profit making, they also shifted the balance of economic and political power back 
to the advantage of the financial sector. The burden of the crisis was transferred 
onto the public budgets and the central bank balance sheets with ordinary citi-
zens and taxpayers left to pay the bill in the form of austerity, public utility pri-
vatizations, political impotence and continued anxiety of when the next crisis is 
going to strike. 
The idea of central banks issuing universally accessible digital money has been 
circulating among academics and activists for more than a decade (Huber and 
Robertson 2000; Jackson and Dyson 2012; Binswanger, Huber, and Mastronardi 
2012; Bjerg 2013; Huber 2014; Dyson and Hodgson 2016; Huber 2017). The true 
novelty is that within the past 1-2 years, central banks have begun to publicly 
announce interest in the idea. Here is how the Bank of England speaks about the 
matter: 
 If a central bank were to issue a digital currency everyone, including busi-
nesses, households and financial institutions other than banks, could store 
value and make payments in electronic central bank money in addition to 
being able to pay with cash. While this may seem like a small change, it 
could have wide-ranging implications for monetary policy and financial sta-
bility. (Bank of England 2017) 
This opens a new window of opportunity for monetary policy measures that 
do not just serve to patch up the existing system but engages with its core fun-
damentals. If we think of monetary policy as incremental adjustments to contin-
uously calibrate an existing system, the question of CBDC should be conceived as 
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a matter of monetary politics. Policy is a plan to achieve certain predefined ends. 
Politics is the discussion, decision and thus definition of these ends.    
There are plenty of reasons to be excited about the growing interest in CBDC 
from people and institutions, who actually have the power to make it happen. At 
the same time it is also important to insist that the question of whether and how 
to implement this new form of money should not only be a decision made by 
central bankers. The responsibility of central bankers is to implement monetary 
policy. It is not to make political decisions on money. The hallmark of democrat-
ic societies is the involvement or at least the representation of those citizens af-
fected by a political decision in the making of this decision. This is especially the 
case with constitutional matters such as the making of laws, the collection of 
taxes, or the use of legitimate force. Decisions on who should create which kinds 
of money in our society belong in that same category. The aim of this paper is 
thus to broaden the scope of the debate on CBDC to include people outside of 
the narrow circles of central bankers and other monetary policy insiders. 
 
Current Debate and Research 
In February 2015, the Bank of England posed the following question in its 
'One Bank Research Agenda': 
From a monetary and financial stability point of view, what are the costs 
and benefits of making a new form of central bank money accessible to a 
wide range of holders? (Bank of England 2015, 31) 
Since the initial formulation of the question of CBDC, the Bank of England has 
launched a research program on the topic as well as made several public an-
nouncements discussing the prospects of implementing its own digital currency 
(Broadbent 2016; Carney 2016; Cleland 2016).  Comparable efforts are found in 
other central banks around the world. The Peoples Bank of China recently stated 
in Bloomberg:  
In recent years, digital currencies have shown considerable promise. Re-
search by the People's Bank of China suggests that the best way to take ad-
vantage of these innovations is for central banks to take the lead, both in 
supervising private digital currencies and in developing digital legal tender of 
their own. At the PBOC, this effort is underway. ... Since 2014, under the 
guidance of Governor Zhou Xiaochuan, the PBOC has attached high im-
portance to the development of legal digital currency. (Yifei 2016) 
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In similar vein, the Swedish Riksbank stated in November 2016: 
The Riksbank is one of the central banks that will need to take an active 
stance on whether or not to issue a digital currency first. We cannot wait 
any longer, and I shall now tell you what we intend to do in the coming 
years.  (Skingsley 2016) 
Other central banks reported to have initiated research into Central Bank 
Digital Cash include at the time of writing least the central banks of Canada, 
Russia, Senegal, Norway, Australia, Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong. David 
Andolfatto has floated the idea of a FedCoin, which would be a US version of 
CBDC, although he was not speaking on the issue in his capacity of Vice Presi-
dent of the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis but as a private individual (An-
dolfatto 2015, see also Koning 2016). The issue has subsequently been picked up 
by Federal Reserve Governor Jerome H. Powell, who discussed it briefly in a 
speech (Powell 2017). Recently, the issue has also been raised in a speech by a 
representative of the European Central Bank: 
The ECB would in particular have to understand the impact – positive or 
negative – of DBM [Digital Base Money - OB] on our primary objective of 
price stability before considering introducing it. Moreover, any value judge-
ment on DBM needs to be assessed against a number of high-level principles, 
namely (1) technological safety, (2) efficiency, (3) technological neutrality, 
and (4) freedom of choice for users of means of payments. (Mersch 2017) 
And the European Parliament has commissioned a report quite boldly stating 
that: 
A digital currency could also be issued by the central bank and potentially 
substitute for bank deposits as the main form of money holding of house-
holds and businesses. This would challenge the present fractional reserve 
system at its core. Increased instability of monetary aggregates and credit 
supply would be a possible outcome, if market participants shifted liquidity 
pro-cyclically between digital money and bank deposits. Commercial banks 
would increasingly have to rely on other funding sources than deposits, so 
that this disruptive change to the fractional reserve system could finally 
pave the way for a more stable financial system. (Fiedler et al. 2017) 
In response to these announcements, researchers have already started to eval-
uate the possible implications of CBDC. Probably the first and certainly the 
most comprehensive study of the issue so far is the paper 'The macroeconomics of 
central bank issued digital currencies' (2016) by Barrdear and Kumhof from the 
Bank of England. This is a DSGE modeling of the effects on growth, inflation, 
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interest rates as well as a number of other macroeconomic variables from the 
implementation of CBDC. A series of other papers take a more theoretical ap-
proach by developing conceptual frameworks for discussing the risks and oppor-
tunities in implementing CBDC. These papers come from different institutions 
such as the Bank of Canada (Fung and Halaburda 2016), the Swedish Riksbank 
(Camera 2017 by commission), the FirstRand Bank in South Africa (foundery 
2016), the Inter-American Development Bank (Ketterer et al. 2016), Banco Bil-
bao Vizcaya Argentaria (Gouveia et al. 2017), as well as the NGO Positive Mon-
ey (Dyson and Hodgson 2016). 
 
Structure of the paper 
The paper begins with a description of the current monetary system, which 
consists of three kinds of money: cash, bank money and central bank reserves. 
The description of existing money forms a baseline for the subsequent definition 
of CBDC and evaluation of its possible implications. The description is then 
complemented with a distinction between three different perspectives on the na-
ture and functioning of money. Depending on the way we think about money, we 
will have different kinds of concerns with regards to the implementation of a new 
form of money in the form of CBDC. 
In the next part of the paper we define CBDC in relation to the three kinds of 
existing money and make a preliminary sketch of different kinds of CBDC design 
models. This leads into a discussion of the conventional monetary policy trilem-
ma, which is normally applied to relations between different currencies. We 
adapt this trilemma to a domestic situation with multiple kinds of money denom-
inated in the same currency. 
The final part of the paper is an analysis of the monetary policy implications 
of each of the different CBDC design models. The adapted monetary policy tri-
lemma is applied to three different scenarios, which is derived from the three 
different perspectives on money: the money user scenario, the money manager 
scenario and the money maker scenario. The analysis considers issues of parity, 
interests, money supply and sovereignty. 
The paper ends with a conclusion summing up the results. 
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The Current Constitution of Money 
Three Kinds of Money 
In order to understand the possible implications of the introduction of CBDC, 
it is useful to first look at the forms of money in our existing payment and bank-
ing system. In this system, we find three different kinds of money: physical cash 
(notes and coins), bank money on account and central bank reserve money. The 
interaction between these three kinds of money in the creation, circulation and 
destruction of money is described in great detail by a number of authors (see 
Werner 2005; Ryan-Collins et al. 2011; Jackson and Dyson 2012; Huber 2014; 
McLeay, Radia, and Thomas 2014; Huber 2017). Instead of reiterating these de-
scriptions, we shall summarize the nature of existing money according to three 
questions: 
What counts as this kind of money? 
Who can use this kind of money? 
Where does this kind of money come from? 
The first may be understood as the question of the ontology of a particular 
form of money, the second as a question of accessibility, and the third as a ques-
tion of supply. 
As cash we count the legitimate paper notes and metal coins in circulation in 
the economy. This kind of money is accessible to all money users in the economy 
including private money users, commercial banks, central banks and govern-
ments. Cash is typically printed, minted and supplied by the central bank. In 
some cases such as UK and US only the printing of paper notes is undertaken by 
the central bank while the minting of coins is the prerogative of the treasury. 
Cash is supplied in response to demands from money users, who want to ex-
change their bank money for cash. This transaction is mediated by the commer-
cial banks that purchase cash for central bank reserve money in order to accom-
modate the demand from money users.   
As bank money on account we count electronically recorded deposit ac-
count liabilities on the ledgers of commercial banks. This bank deposit account 
money constitute assets for money users. Bank money is accessible to all money 
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users in the economy in so far as they have a bank account. Bank money is sup-
plied into the economy, when commercial banks credit the deposit accounts of 
money users. This typically happens as part of the extension of loans to borrow-
ers. Money users thus exchange debt for bank money. Bank money may also be 
created as part of financial trading, when sellers of financial securities or cash 
happen to hold deposit accounts with the bank, which are then credited as pay-
ment of the bank's purchase of securities or cash. It is also possible for commer-
cial banks to create bank money, when they make payments of salaries, goods 
purchases or dividends to employees, suppliers or shareholders, who happen to 
hold deposit accounts in the bank. When deposit account holders make debt re-
payments or interest payments to the bank, bank money is destroyed. 
As central bank reserve money we count electronically recorded current 
account liabilities on the ledgers of central banks. This money is only accessible 
to money users that hold an account with the central bank. Central bank ac-
count holders typically only include commercial deposit banks, the treasury and 
foreign central banks. In some cases, certain non-bank financial institutions as 
well as employees of the central bank may also hold an account with the central 
bank and thus have access to central bank reserve money. Central bank reserve 
money is mainly supplied by being credited to commercial banks' current ac-
counts as part of the purchase of governments bonds or certain other financial 
securities. Commercial banks may also borrow central bank reserve money from 
the central bank, which are then credited to their account. Such borrowing nor-
mally requires the commercial banks to post collateral in the form of financial 
securities. Central banks also create reserve money, when they credit the gov-
ernment's account in the central bank as payment of dividends or in exchange for 
government bonds. Such direct monetization of government debt is, however, 
prohibited under the EU Lisbon Treaty (§26). It is also possible for the central 
bank to create new reserve money by crediting the accounts of foreign central 
banks in exchange for foreign currency reserve money. 
Comparing these three kinds of money in terms of ontology, accessibility and 
supply, we can group them in three pairs each sharing a particular feature, which 
the third kind lacks: 
- Bank money and central bank reserve money are both electronic, which cash 
is not. 
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- Cash and bank money are both universally accessible, which central bank re-
serve money is not. 
- Cash and central bank reserve money are both supplied by the central bank, 
which bank money is not. 
This logic is illustrated in the Venn diagram below (Figure 1):  
 
Figure 1: The features of existing money 
 
We shall return to this diagram later. 
 
Three Perspectives on Money 
It may seem that with the description of our current money system as consti-
tuted by three different kinds of money, we have been jumping ahead of our-
selves. Do we not need an initial definition of money before we proceed to de-
scribe, what counts as money? What about treasury bills and government bonds? 
What about money market instruments? What about Bitcoin? What about gold? 
Are these not also different kinds of money? 
Discussions about the definition of money are usually raised through the ques-
tion: What is money? And this question is usually settled through a listing of the 
three functions of money: medium of exchange, store of value, unit of account. 
This kind of textbook account of money, however, suffers from a confusion of two 
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things. It answers the question of what money is by listing what money does. 
While the distinction between the three functions of money is indeed useful, this 
should not lead us to conclude that it has provided us with a definition of money. 
If we dig below the surface of textbook economics and explore the history of 
the discipline, we find that there is in fact no consensus on the definition of mon-
ey. What we find instead is a number of different answers to the question: What 
is money. In another work, I have mapped out these answers and grouped them 
into three different theories or schools of thinking: the commodity theory, the 
state theory and the credit theory (Bjerg 2014). While these different theories 
may be identified and personified in particular thinkers in the history of econom-
ics, they also constitute three ideal typical perspectives on money that coexist 
and compete in contemporary discourses on money. The distinction between 
these three different perspectives on money is relevant in the discussion of 
CBDC, as we can use it to group different kinds of concerns and interests regard-
ing the design and implementation of this new kind of money. The three perspec-
tives are summarized in the following: 
 
The money user perspective 
What would you answer a four year old child, who asked the questions: What 
is money? Even though money is used for a variety of purposes such as settle-
ment of debts, comparison of value, payment of taxes, saving, speculation, etc. 
the arch typical image of money in action is probably the exchange of money for 
commodities in a store. Chances are, this is also the example that you would in-
voke in your answer to the child: Money is a thing that we use to buy milk, car-
rots, bread and other commodities at the supermarket. And to further illustrate 
the point, you might show the child a 100 kroner note and some coins and say: 
This is money? 
The 'cash in the supermarket' example of money, puts to the fore the function 
of money as medium of exchange. This is the so-called commodity theory of 
money (Bjerg 2014, 90–96). The obvious reference point is Adam Smith's classi-
cal story about the butcher, the brewer and the baker, who overcome the 
'clogged and embarrassed' operations of barter by adopting precious metals as 
means of exchange (Smith 1776, 24). The gist of the story is the explanation of 
how money emerges as one particular commodity, usually gold or silver, that is 
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singled out as a generally accepted medium of exchange to perform the function 
of payment for all other commodities. 
We shall refer to this as the money user perspective on money. The vantage 
point of the money user perspective is the private individual or company, for 
whom money is primarily a means to buy and sell commodities, services, capital, 
labour, etc. The money user is thus first and foremost concerned with the func-
tioning of money as a medium of exchange: Which kinds of money can be used to 
make payments in the supermarket? How can I use my mobile phone to transfer 
money?  Does my company have to accept payments in cash? What happens to 
people without a bank account, when more and more payment systems are digi-
talized? These concerns also include questions of security and privacy: Can my 
my bank account be hacked when I make payments over the internet? Can the 
government and others trace my use of money, when I make electronic pay-
ments? Can crime and illicit economic activities be inhibited through the aboli-
tion of cash?  From the money user perspective the difference between cash and 
bank money is merely one of practical functionality. The former is physical and 
the latter is electronic. Since central bank reserve money is not available to the 
ordinary money user, this kind of money barely registers in this perspective. 
 
The money manager perspective 
What would we answer an eight year old child, who asked the question: What 
is a bank? A simple answer would be that a bank is a place that keeps our mon-
ey safe, so we don't have to worry about losing our money or being robbed. A 
bank is a place that stores money. If the child is smart, we might make our an-
swer slightly more sophisticated by explaining how people with a lot of money 
put them into the bank, where people with less money may then go and borrow 
money. And if the child is very smart, we might tell the full story that today 
banks are the primary suppliers of money in the economy since the money that 
we use for our electronic payments are credits with commercial banks. This bank 
account credit money are borrowed into existence when money users take out 
new loans. 
When we shift our perspective from the 'cash in the supermarket' to the 'debt 
in the bank' image, we arrive at a very different understanding of money. We do 
not go to the bank in order to buy goods and services. We go there to get a loan 
or pay off our debts and interest. And while banks do of course use money to pay 
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salaries to their employees and to buy different kinds of inventory, their defining 
characteristic is the capacity to issue liabilities that maintain a stable value over 
time and thus function as the supply of money in the economy. The value of con-
temporary bank account money is not 'stored' in commodities such as gold or 
other kinds of money such as cash or reserve money. The assets 'mirroring' the 
value of deposit liabilities on bank balance sheets largely consist of loans to dif-
ferent kinds of money users. In brief banks operate by storing value in the form 
of money backed by debt. This account of banks is elaborated in the so-called 
credit theory of money (Bjerg 2014, 115–54). Classic references in this theory 
include Joseph Schumpeter (Schumpeter 1934, 70–74) and the lesser known Al-
fred Mitchell-Innes (Innes 1913, 1914) but in recent years the theory has been 
picked up and developed to account for the contemporary economy (Werner 
2005; Ryan-Collins et al. 2011; Dyson and Jackson 2013; Huber 2014, 2017). The 
theory conceives of money as a particular form of debt, which is universally ac-
cepted in payments in the economy due to the exceptional status of the debtor. 
In our economy today, commercial banks have this position as universally ac-
cepted exceptional debtors, which is why their liabilities are conceived as an ex-
ceptional store of value.  
We refer to this as the money manager perspective on money. The vantage 
point of this perspective is obviously the commercial bank but we may also in-
clude affiliated financial institutions such as the investment bank, the hedge 
fund, the pension fund, etc. that share the function of earning money by manag-
ing money. The money manager is primarily concerned about the ways that 
money functions as a store of value. The business model of a bank is to manage 
the interplay between money liabilities on the right hand side of the balance 
sheet and non-money assets on the left hand side. If bank liabilities lose their 
capacity as an exceptional store of value, banks will be the subject of different 
types of bank runs and they are eventually going to go out of business. The key 
to this business model is of course the earning of interests. Since bank liabilities 
are perceived as exceptional stores of value, money users accept to hold these at 
a relatively low rate of interest, while at the same time paying a higher interest 
rate on their loans to the bank.  
The concerns of the money manager include questions such as: How do my 
bank account money retain their capacity as superior stores of value relative to 
cash and central bank reserve money? How much can I expand the balance sheet 
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of my bank and thus the potential sources of income without jeopardizing the 
capacity of my liabilities as stores of value? How do I prevent the liabilities of 
other types of institutions to compete with the exceptional status of my liabilities 
as money? In the money manager perspective, the difference between different 
kinds of money is constituted by the fact that cash and central bank reserve 
money are non- or low-interest earning assets on the balance sheet of the bank, 
while bank account money are liabilities on the balance sheet where they emerge 
as counter items to loans, securities or other high- or medium-interest earning 
assets. 
 
The money maker perspective 
Now finally, what would we answer a twelve year old child asking the ques-
tion: What is a krone? Again, we might begin with a simple answer: The krone is 
the currency of our country Denmark. If you go to another country such as for 
instance UK prices are listed in pounds and you have to pay in another kind of 
money. But perhaps the child insists and says: Yes, I know that, but I did not 
ask what is the krone, I asked what is a krone? By way of an answer, we might 
find a 1 krone coin in our wallet and point to it saying: This is a krone. Since we 
know this child to be very smart (he understood how banks create money already 
when he was eight) we might add: Why are you asking such a simple question? 
And now the child says: I heard someone on the news talking about the cashless 
society and I was wondering that if we no longer have physical notes and coins, 
how do we know what a krone is? 
What is at stake in this question is the function of money as a unit of account. 
Prices of commodities and services as well as outstanding debts within an econo-
my are denominated in the currency of that economy. The currency thus func-
tions as a numeraire allowing us to compare the value of different things and 
obligations by using a common monetary standard as bench mark. There are a 
number of different factors that determine, which currency counts as unit of ac-
count in an economy. Proponents of the so-called state theory of money point to 
the denomination of taxes as the most decisive factor (Bjerg 2014, 100–114). The 
classic reference for this theory is Georg Friedrich Knapp, who, among other 
things, served as a key inspiration for Keynes (Knapp 1924). The sovereign state 
has the power to determine the currency in which taxes and other debts to the 
state must be paid. It can also impose legal tender laws to extend this to the 
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payment of other debts among citizens. This creates a constant and general de-
mand for a particular kind of money in the economy, since most people will even-
tually need some of this money to pay their taxes and debts. The state then usu-
ally combines the power of taxation with a monopoly on money creation. It is 
then in a position to create the very same money that the citizens need in order 
to pay their taxes and debts. Once a particular currency is instituted as the gen-
eral unit of account, this money automatically begins to function as a general 
medium of exchange and store of value in the economy. 
The difference between the question: 'What is the krone?' and the question: 
'What is a krone? is a difference between abstract and concrete unit of account. 
When we encounter prices denominated in kroner in the supermarket or debts 
denominated in kroner from the bank or the tax authorities, we encounter the 
krone as an abstract unit of account. But this function of money ultimately relies 
on the designation of a concrete unit of account. In order to price commodities, 
services and assets in terms of a currency, we need to know what is ultimately 'a 
Krone' or 'a Pound'. Among themselves money users may decide to use all kinds 
of things to settle payments. A car dealer may agree to accept two used cars in 
payment of one new car. A bank may agree to accept government bonds in pay-
ments of a debt. A farmer may pay his workers in produce and accommodation. 
But in order for the currency to function as a stable unit of account it has to 
legally designate some entity as the ultimate incarnation of money? The point 
here is not that money ultimately has to rely on gold or another commodity with 
intrinsic value. It is not even that money ultimately has to have a physical mani-
festation. There just has to be a final benchmark for the measurement of differ-
ent prices. There has to be some entity, where exchange value and nominal value 
coincide by definition. 
Our current money system relies on a monetary division of labour between the 
commercial banks, the central bank and the treasury. The treasury has the sov-
ereign power of taxation. It accepts payment of taxes in three different kinds of 
money: cash, bank money and central bank money. This means that all of these 
monies principally count as concrete units of account. Since central bank reserve 
money is only accessible to banks, this payment option is closed to all other 
money users. Furthermore, the payment of taxes in cash is in most modern econ-
omy quite inconvenient and cumbersome. This means that commercial bank ac-
count money is the dominant concrete unit of account. 
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The sovereign power of taxation exercised by the treasury is today used to 
support the creation of money exercised by commercial banks. There are, howev-
er, a couple of caveats in this monetary order. Money users still have the right to 
convert their bank money into cash in effect forcing the banks to pay their debt 
to the money users in notes and coins. Banks also have the right to demand their 
mutual credits settled in central bank reserve money. The role of the central 
bank is to prevent either of these two things from happening. The policy man-
date of financial stability translates into the responsibility to maintain parity 
between cash, bank money and central bank reserve money thus maintaining the 
issuance and circulation of bank money at its nominal value. The sovereign state 
in the form of the treasury and the central bank take responsibility for the 
maintenance of the abstract unit of account. In turn, the de facto control of the 
concrete units of account has been outsourced to the commercial banks.  
We refer to this kind of questioning into the nature of money as unit of ac-
count as the money maker perspective. Even though the state as incarnated in 
the government, the treasury and the central bank seems to have relinquished 
much of its control of the making of money, these institutions still constitute the 
natural vantage point of the money maker perspective. In so far as these institu-
tions are not only incarnations of the state but also the representatives of the 
people of the democratic state, the money maker perspective is also the perspec-
tive of the citizen. While concrete money units of account are unevenly distribut-
ed among the money users in the economy, the currency as such is (or at least 
should be) a public common of all citizens regardless of their individual wealth. 
Even the debtor (or perhaps especially the debtor), who owns less than no mon-
ey, has a legitimate interest in the currency in which his debt is denominated.  
The primary concern of the money maker perspective is the question of sover-
eignty: Who controls the creation of money in the economy? What are the condi-
tions for sovereign monetary policy? How does monetary policy correspond with 
the interests of the democratic state? What are the relations and boundaries be-
tween monetary and fiscal policy? In the money maker perspective, the crucial 
difference between the three kinds of money is that cash and central bank re-
serves are subject to the state monopoly on money creation, while bank money is 
issued at the behest of a particular kind of private companies. Another important 
difference is that electronic bank money and central bank reserve money can be 
interest bearing, while physical cash is by definition interest free. 
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What is CBDC? 
Defining CBDC 
Having mapped out the constitution of our current monetary system, we now 
turn to Central Bank Digital Currency to see what the implementation of this 
new kind of money does to this constitution. The first task is simply to define 
what CBDC is. For this purpose we invoke the three questions posed at the be-
ginning of the previous section: 
What counts as this kind of money? 
Who can use this kind of money? 
Where does this kind of money come from? 
In order to answer these questions, we take the definition provided by 
Barrdear and Kumhof of the Bank of England as our starting point: 
By CBDC, we refer to a central bank granting universal, electronic, 24x7, 
national-currency-denominated and interest-bearing access to its balance 
sheet. (Barrdear and Kumhof 2016) 
As CBDC we count deposit liabilities that are electronically registered on the 
central bank balance sheet. Access to these deposits is universal, which means 
that they can be held and used by principally all money users in the economy. 
The central bank issues these liabilities by crediting the accounts of money users. 
Summing up the issues of ontology, accessibility and supply, CBDC is electronic, 
universally accessible, central bank issued money. 
This definition allows us to fit CBDC into the Venn diagram of the three ex-
isting forms of money (figure 2): 
While each of the three existing forms of money is defined by lacking one of 
the features, CBDC is defined by no such lack. The diagram illustrates how 
CBDC combines all the three features of cash, bank money and central bank 
reserve money. This has profound implications for the discussion about the de-
sign and implementation of CBDC. It means that CBDC potentially competes 
with all of the existing forms of money. This competition automatically raises the 
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question of whether CBDC should be a replacement or a mere supplement to any 
of the existing forms of money. 
 
Figure 2: The features of CBDC 
With regards to existing reserve money, this question is quite straightforward 
in so far as CBDC simply comes into being as a wider range of money users in 
the economy are provided with the opportunity to hold deposits with the central 
bank. The Barrdear and Kumhof definition takes it for granted that CBDC im-
plementation implies universal access to the central bank balance sheet. It should 
be noted that it is indeed being discussed whether such access should be restrict-
ed to a more narrow range of non-bank financial firms (Broadbent 2016, 7; Cle-
land 2016, 5; Carney 2016, 6). In any case, a two-tier system with CBDC and 
existing central bank reserve money makes no sense, so we can rule out that op-
tion.  
This leaves us with the questions regarding the relation between CBDC and 
the two other forms of money. The two crucial questions are simply: 
- Should cash be abolished with the implementation of CBDC or should the 
two forms of money co-exist? 
- Should bank money be abolished with the implementation of CBDC or 
should the two forms of money co-exist? 
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Depending on the way that these two questions are answered, there are four 
different ways of combining CBDC with existing money each constituting a par-
ticular design model of the monetary system: 
1) CBDC as complimentary to both cash and bank money 
2) CBDC as a replacement for cash and complimentary to bank money 
3) CBDC as a replacement for both cash and bank money 
4) CBCD as complimentary to cash and a replacement for bank money 
It may be tempting to list the pros and cons of each of these models in order 
to arrive at an evaluation of which one is the most optimal. Such an approach, 
however, would ignore the political nature of the monetary system. As we have 
seen in the previous section, the nature of money may be viewed from very dif-
ferent perspectives. Each of these perspectives comes with a particular set of con-
cerns and interests. In his analysis of the history of debt, Graeber aptly notes 
how 'money has no essence. It's not “really” anything; therefore, its nature has 
always been and presumably always will be a matter of political contention' 
(Graeber 2011, 372). The ambivalent nature of money also plays into the discus-
sion about changing the monetary system and implementing a new form of mon-
ey such as CBDC. The way we think about money and imagine what money can 
and should do for us also frames our concerns and interests with respect to the 
design of a monetary system with CBDC. 
 
Electronic Cash, Universal Reserves, or Sovereign Account Money? 
In order to explore this issue we shall connect the three perspectives on money 
with the definition of CBDC. As we have seen, CBDC is defined by integrating 
the three features of existing money: electronic, universally accessible and central 
bank issued. Using the logic of the Venn diagram, we can also define CBDC in 
terms of each of the existing forms of money. These would be definitions that 
think of CBDC as an elaborated version of cash, bank money or central bank 
money: 
1) CBDC is an electronic version of cash. 
2) CBDC is a universally accessible version of central bank reserve money. 
3) CBDC is a central bank issued version of commercial bank account mon-
ey. 
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From a purely logical perspective this may seem to be nothing but a play with 
words as there is no technical difference between these three definitions. They do 
not even add anything to the initial definition of CBDC. In the terminology of 
Kant, we would refer to them as analytical propositions that do nothing but re-
combine the inherent elements of the initial definitions of the different kinds of 
money. The significance of this play with words, however, emerges, when we 
move from the technical and logical and into the domain of politics. While each 
of the three definitions amount to the same basic features, they signify three dif-
ferent ways of thinking about CBDC in relation to existing forms of money. It 
makes a crucial difference for the political discussion about design and implemen-
tation, whether we think of CBDC as an elaborate version of cash, an elaborate 
version of central bank reserve money, or an elaborate version of commercial 
bank account money. 
In order to think analytically about this issue, we shall make three proposi-
tions that guide the discussion of the subsequent sections of the paper:   
- We propose to sum up the three definitions of CBDC in terms of three 
names that signify a particular way of thinking about money: electronic 
cash, universal reserves, or sovereign account money.  
- We propose that the particular ways of thinking about money signified by 
the three names correspond to the three perspectives on money laid out in 
the previous section. This means that thinking about money from the 
money user perspective leads you to think about CBDC as electronic 
cash, thinking money from the money manager perspective leads you to 
think about CBDC as universal reserves, and thinking about CBDC from 
the money maker perspective leads you to think about CBDC as sover-
eign account money. 
- We also propose that each of the three names corresponding to a particu-
lar perspective on money carries a predisposition towards a particular de-
sign of CBDC. Thinking about CBDC as electronic cash carries a predis-
position towards a model where CBDC co-exists with cash and bank 
money. Thinking about CBDC as universal reserves carries a predisposi-
tion towards a model where cash is abolished and CBDC co-exist with 
bank money. Thinking about CBDC as sovereign account money branches 
into two models depending on whether it takes the central bank or the 
citizen as its vantage point. The former vantage point carries a predispo-
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sition towards a model where both cash and bank money is abolished and 
CBDC is the only form of money in circulation. The latter vantage point 
carries a predisposition towards a model where bank money is abolished 
and CBDC co-exists with cash. 
These propositions are of course speculative deductions. Their purpose is to 
serve as the basis for the construction of three ideal typical scenarios with re-
gards to the design and implementation of CBDC. The three ideal typical scenar-
ios are summarized in table 1. 
 
Table I: Ideal typical scenarios of CBDC 
 Money User Money Manager Money Maker 
Vantage point consumer and firm bank citizen/central bank 
Primary function medium of exchange store of value unit of account 
CBDC definition electronic cash universal reserves sovereign account 
money 
Design model + cash 
+ bank money 
- cash 
+ bank money 
+ cash / - cash 
- bank money 
 
In part 3, we shall be looking into each of these scenarios in order to unfold, 
how a particular view on money tends to point to a particular design model for 
CBDC. Furthermore, each of the design models carries with them a set of mone-
tary policy implications and even contradictions. As we explore the different sce-
narios, we shall also be unfolding these implications and contradictions. 
The primary design questions regard the status of cash and bank money that 
were listed previously: Should CBDC circulate together with cash or bank mon-
ey, together with both, or together with none of them. We shall also be address-
ing two other questions, which are pertinent with regards to the design, imple-
mentation and subsequent management of CBDC. This first question concerns 
the introduction of new CBDC into the economy and the management of the 
total supply:  
- Which agents should have access to buy CBDC directly from the central 
bank and in exchange for which kinds of assets? 
The second question concerns the use of CBDC as a monetary policy tool: 
- Should CBDC carry interest and should this interest be allowed to go in-
to negative? 
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As we are going to see, these questions are not entirely open as they are par-
tially determined by the particular design model, which is chosen. 
 
The Monetary Policy Trilemma of CBDC 
Before moving into the exploration of each of the three scenarios, we provide a 
theoretical model to help us understand the monetary policy implications and 
contradictions of different design models of CBDC. The monetary dynamics of 
CBDC implementation may be understood in terms of an adapted version of the 
so-called monetary policy trilemma. 
The original version of the monetary policy trilemma is based on ideas from 
Keynes (1930) subsequently elaborated by Mundell (1963) and Fleming (1962) 
and ultimately popularized by Obstfeld (1997), who coined the exact formulation 
of a trilemma. Obstfeld and Taylor provide the following definition: 
The macroeconomic policy trilemma for open economies ... follows from a 
basic fact: An open capital market deprives a country’s government of the 
ability simultaneously to target its exchange rate and to use monetary policy 
in pursuit of other economic objectives. (Obstfeld and Taylor 2002, 7) 
Figure 3 below sums up the proposition of the trilemma, which is that any 
monetary policy authority (government or central bank) can simultaneously only 
pursue two out of the three policy objectives: monetary autonomy in the man-
agement of interest rates, currency exchange-rate management, and free capital 
mobility. 
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Figure 3: The international monetary policy trilemma 
 
If a central bank pursues a pegged or just managed exchange rate policy 
against another currency, sets interest rates according to domestic monetary poli-
cy goals, while at the same time allowing money to flow in and out of the coun-
try, speculators/investors will take advantage of interest rate arbitrage opportu-
nities between the two currency zones. This puts pressure on the currency and 
forces the central bank to do one of three things: (A) abandon a sovereign mone-
tary policy and bring interest rates in line with that of the other currency, (B) 
allow the currency exchange to float, or (C) impose capital controls. 
We can also understand these three options in terms of the three functions of 
money: If the central bank imposes capital controls (C), it is restricting the use of 
the national money as a means of exchange. It can no longer be used to buy and 
sell foreign currency. If the central bank allows currency exchange rates to float 
(B), it is deteriorating the function of the national money as a secure store of 
value. And if the central bank abandons a sovereign monetary policy (A), it is 
giving up on the status of the currency as a unique unit of account. 
The premise of the conventional monetary policy trilemma is the co-existence 
of two different currencies, which are created and managed by two difference 
central banks. This constitutes a situation of competition between two different 
kinds of money and two different money makers, which in turn potentially cre-
ates arbitrage opportunities for speculators/investors. In the context of our cur-
rent discussion about CBDC, the situation is analogous albeit different. If we 
begin with the current constitution of money, we also find a situation of competi-
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tion between two or three kinds of money and two different money makers. The 
different kinds of money are, however, not functionally equivalent in the same 
way as two different currencies. As we have discussed previously, cash, bank 
money and central bank reserve money are qualitatively different and they do 
not function as perfect substitutes for each other. This means that the competi-
tion between the different kinds of money is less perfect and much more restrict-
ed that the kind of competition underlying the conventional trilemma. 
Given the fact that CBDC is both electronic and universally accessible, it is 
functionally equivalent to bank money. This brings about a kind of competition 
between central bank money and commercial bank money, which is comparable 
to the kind of competition between different currencies found in the conventional 
trilemma. The implementation of CBDC thus brings about the same kinds of 
contradictions that are found in the conventional trilemma. Let us see how we 
can translate the elements of the international monetary policy trilemma onto a 
domestic monetary system with CBDC. The translation is illustrated in figure 4. 
- The conventional policy objective of exchange rate management between 
two currencies translates into the domestic policy objective of securing financial 
stability by maintaining parity between commercial bank money on the one 
hand and CBDC and cash on the other. 
- The conventional policy objective of monetary autonomy in decisions on 
central bank interest rates translates into monetary sovereignty, which is the 
prerogative of the monetary authorities to use the creation of CBDC not only as 
a monetary policy tool to support commercial bank credit creation but also as a 
fiscal policy tool to stimulate the general economy. The abandonment of mone-
tary sovereignty means that commercial banks are the primary drivers of money 
creation.  
- The conventional policy objective of free capital mobility translates into 
free convertibility between commercial bank money and central bank money. 
We may understand the implementation of CBDC as the introduction of such 
convertibility. With universal access to the central bank balance sheet, ordinary 
money now for the first time have the option to choose between holding electron-
ic money with the central bank or with commercial banks. 
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Figure 4: The domestic monetary policy trilemma 
 
Our proposition is that a monetary system with two competing money crea-
tors, the central bank and the commercial banking sector, can simultaneously 
only pursue two out of these three policy objectives. Since central banks have not 
hitherto been able to create electronic money, ordinary money users have had 
only a limited and inconvenient opportunity for convertibility between commer-
cial bank money and central bank money. Furthermore, central banks have also 
had only limited opportunity to supply money directly into the economy to pro-
vide fiscal stimulus. This means that the domestic monetary policy trilemma has 
been solved by some version of (C) and (A). The overall priority in contemporary 
monetary policy seems to be the maintenance of parity between commercial bank 
deposit money and the two forms of central bank money. Central banks seem to 
have been content with giving up both the money users' opportunity for convert-
ibility as well as their own monetary sovereignty to achieve this objective.  
The implementation of CBDC is the equivalent of a relaxation of capital con-
trols as money users are now granted free convertibility as well as an opportunity 
for sovereign money creation as fiscal stimulus. In the following sections, we shall 
explore possible solutions to the contradictions that such opportunities bring 
about.  
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The Money User Scenario 
CBDC as Electronic Cash 
Should the Riksbank issue electronic means of payment in the same way as 
we now issue cash? This is a natural question for a central bank, as techno-
logical advances create new opportunities, as the printing press once upon a 
time made it possible to print banknotes. Banknotes were a complement to 
the minted coins, and are so today too. Similarly, an electronic means of 
payment, say an e-krona, could be a complement to physical cash. This is 
the question I intend to discuss today. The question is particularly relevant 
for us in Sweden, as cash is being used to a declining extent and is some-
times difficult to get hold of. (Skingsley 2016, 1)  
This is how Cecilia Skingsley of the Swedish Riksbank presents the question of 
CBDC. The quote provides an illustration of the conception of CBDC as an elec-
tronic form of cash. The stated reason for the Riksbank's interest in CBDC is a 
rapidly declining use of cash as a means of payment in the Swedish economy. 
This means that 'cash is no longer as easily accessible as before' and 'the general 
public finds it more difficult to get hold of money issued by the Riksbank' 
(Skingsley 2016, 1). We see here, how Skingsley represents the perspective and 
concerns of the 'general public' as money users. 
The key concern is that if the development of the payment system is entirely 
determined by 'market participants', some groups of money users, including 
'many consumers ... small companies and local clubs,' may lose 'access to basic 
payment services, including cash. In situations where the market is not able to 
supply basic payment services, it is the task of the state to ensure that everyone 
has access to such services' (Skingsley 2016, 6). It is, in other words, the respon-
sibility of the central bank to secure the financial inclusion of all money users. 
Another set of concerns regarding the declining availability of cash include is-
sues of anonymity, security and resilience: 
One cannot get away from the fact that cash has properties that electronic 
payment services lack. Will this mean that we lose a means of payment that 
cannot be directly replaced with something else? Cash can be handed over 
regardless of access to electricity or the internet. Cash payments are anony-
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mous. A payment can be made in cash without involving the banks. Even if 
cash is not used on a daily basis, it comprises a backup option in certain cri-
sis situations. (Skingsley 2016, 6)  
Again, we see how these concerns emerge from the money user perspective. 
This perspective also plays out in Skingsley's account of the invention of money 
in terms of the classical story of barter: 
The barter system is, in my view, the most important innovation of all time. 
The reason I think this is that trade is a necessary condition for welfare. 
There is hardly anyone who grows all their own food. Nor do we mine iron 
ore and grow rubber trees to be able to build our own car. Trade allows us 
to specialize in making goods and services that other people want and which 
therefore have a value. The carpenter does woodwork, the dentist fixes 
teeth, the author writes books and so on. In the beginning, we traded with 
one another simply by swapping goods and services. However, the barter 
system is not practical, as it means you have to find someone who has what 
you want and who also wants what you have. /.../ Money plays an im-
portant role in reducing transaction costs and this is why money is the sec-
ond most important innovation in the history of the world. (Skingsley 2016, 
2)  
The design model proposed by the Riksbank as represented by Skingsley is 
one in which CBDC is complementary to both cash and bank money. While the 
option of replacing bank money does not even seem to be on the table, she ex-
plicitly states that: 'If the Riksbank chooses to issue e-krona, it would not be to 
replace cash, but so that the e-krona can act as a complement to cash' (Skingsley 
2016, 7). In so far as the Riksbank's primary concern seems to be to represent 
the interests of the general public as money users, this design model makes per-
fect sense as it provides the money users with the widest scope of choice in terms 
of money and payment options. 
The point of this review of the speech from the Riksbank is not to suggest 
that it represents the money user perspective exclusively. In its entirety, the 
speech includes a range of other viewpoints and reflections that should be associ-
ated with the two other perspectives. The same goes for the other speeches and 
text that we shall be quoting in our exposition of the other scenarios. 
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Sacrificing Sovereignty to Save Parity 
By allowing money users the opportunity to hold money in the form of bank 
deposit money, cash or CBDC, as well as the option to freely convert between 
these kinds of money, the money user scenario opens up the dynamics of the 
monetary policy trilemma. 
From the history of economics, we know the phrase 'bad money drives out 
good' also referred to as Gresham's law. Gresham's law was originally formulated 
in the context of precious metals money and it refers to a situation, where differ-
ent forms of money circulate at the same nominal value, while there is a discrep-
ancy between their respective commodity values. This may occur in a system 
based on a simultaneous circulation of gold and silver coins denominated at a 
certain fixed price ratio. If the market price of gold begins to increase relative to 
silver, the spread between market price and nominal value will also become 
smaller for gold coins than for silver coins. In such a situation, the 'bad' silver 
money will be preferred as medium of exchange and debt settlement thus 'driving 
out' of circulation the 'good' gold money, which is hoarded and used as a store of 
value. 
The essence of central banks' responsibility for financial stability is the 
maintenance of parity between the different forms of money in circulation. Parity 
management amounts to keeping the mechanisms of Gresham's law in check. 
Skingsley touches upon this issue as she notes how 'the special thing about cen-
tral bank money is that it has no nominal credit risk, as it stands for a claim on 
the central bank, which cannot go bankrupt.' In contrast, 'the commercial bank 
money does entail a risk - even if the risk is slight. If the bank fails, you may not 
be able to redeem your entire claim on the bank from its bankruptcy estate' 
(Skingsley 2016, 3–4). The introduction of CBDC poses a challenge to parity. If 
money users have access to risk free central bank money, why would they hold 
risky commercial bank money? The risk to financial stability is, in other words, 
that 'good' CBDC drives out 'bad' commercial bank deposit money. Such a break 
of parity is what we refer to as a 'run on the bank'. 
Assuming that the central bank wants to maintain the policy objective of par-
ity, it has to give up monetary sovereignty by putting its monetary policy solely 
in the service of defending parity. This is option (A) in the policy trilemma. We 
shall explore the implications of this option. 
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There are four main channels through which the central bank in collaboration 
with the treasury maintains parity. All of these channels are already in play to-
day, but they may be pushed to further extremes in a system with CBDC. The 
first is by allowing citizens to carry out their financial transactions with the gov-
ernment in commercial bank money. If the treasury accepts bank money in pay-
ments of taxes at its nominal value, this provides a form of 'tax standard' on this 
kind of money. If money users start to worry about the credit risk of commercial 
bank money, the treasury provides a guarantee that the money users can always 
redeem this 'bad money' at the nominal value. In a system with CBDC, the 
treasury would thus still give the citizens the option of paying taxes in commer-
cial bank money and the government may even choose to pay out salaries to pub-
lic employees in bank money to support parity. 
The second channel is the lender (or buyer) of last resort facility. The purpose 
of this facility today is to prevent liquidity crises by providing commercial banks 
with the opportunity to borrow or buy central bank reserves or cash in exchange 
for government bonds or other low risk securities. This gives the banks liquidity 
and flexibility in their asset management, which allows them to respond to shift-
ing demands from money users for different kinds of money. In a system with 
CBDC, the banks would retain this opportunity. If money users were to suddenly 
demand conversion of their bank deposit money into CBDC in excess of the 
bank's stock of CBDC, the banks would be able to turn around to the central 
bank and convert their assets into CBDC, which would then subsequently be 
used to redeem the deposit liabilities of the banks. In extreme cases, the use of 
this channel in the defense of parity may face the central bank with some diffi-
cult questions as to the kind of assets it would be willing to accept in exchange 
or as collateral for the provision of CBDC to the banks. This issue shall be fur-
ther explored in the next section. 
The third channel is the depositor insurance, which guarantees commercial 
bank money up to a certain amount (in Europe € 100.000) in the case of bank 
defaults. While such insurance is today initially underwritten by the collective of 
commercial banks, history seems to have established the expectation that in the 
case of a major systemic crisis, the central bank will ultimately step in to guaran-
tee the guarantee. In a system with CBDC, the central bank will provide a simi-
lar guarantee by de facto promising to take over the deposit liabilities of insol-
vent banks and redeem them in CBDC. Such a promise would function to allevi-
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ate credit risk concerns among money users holding bank money and thereby 
serve to maintain parity. 
 
The Question of Interest 
The fourth channel, which would in practice function as the first line of de-
fense against the challenge to parity, is the monetary policy tool of interests on 
CBDC. While the first three channels aim to defend parity against the logic of 
Gresham's Law by making commercial bank money as 'good' as CBDC, this 
fourth channel provides a similar defense by making CBDC as 'bad' as commer-
cial bank money. Skingsley lays out the problem like this:  
If the Riksbank launches an e-krona with a positive interest rate, it can in 
some situations be very attractive for both the general public and companies 
to convert their account balances in the banks to e-krona with the Riksbank. 
(Skingsley 2016, 9) 
The difference between electronic CBDC and physical cash is not merely one 
of convenience and functionality. While cash is by definition interest free, CBDC 
can be interest bearing. This provides the central bank with a tool to defend par-
ity. In order to compensate money users for taking the credit risk of holding bank 
money instead of risk free CBDC, the central bank must set the interest rate on 
CBDC below the interest rate on bank money. This is not unlike the way that 
the central bank today adjusts the interest rate on central bank reserves. But 
still the central bank finds itself having to choose between the defense of parity 
and the use of monetary policy for other purposes. 
If the central bank is committed to maintaining an interest rate on CBDC, 
which is lower than the interest rate on deposits, and perhaps even committed to 
widening the spread, if the general trust in the solvency of the banks is deterio-
rating, then the commercial banks' decisions on their deposit rates effectively set 
the upper bound of the CBDC interest rate and thus also a limit the scope of 
central bank monetary policy. What would happen, if the central bank wanted to 
raise interest rates in order to combat inflation, while the commercial banks in-
sisted on lowering deposit rates to increase their profit margins? Would the cen-
tral bank be willing to jeopardize parity to defeat the commercial banks in such a 
monetary policy chicken game? And what if a central bank committed to curren-
cy exchange rate management see the central bank of its benchmark currency 
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raise interest rates, while its domestic banks insists on lowering their deposit 
rates. In such a situation, the central bank would find itself squeezed between the 
two policy trilemmas as it would have to choose between maintaining a currency 
peg or maintaining parity. 
An even more pertinent problem in the current economic climate of historical-
ly low interest rates and a perceived risk of deflation is constituted by the lower 
bound on interest rates. The fact that money users may choose not only between 
bank money and CBDC but also cash institutes a de facto zero lower bound on 
interest rates. Even if it is technically possible to allow interest rates on CBDC 
to move below zero, such a move would soon compel money users to convert into 
interest free cash. 
In a situation with declining bank money deposit rates, the central bank could 
find itself stuck and unable to adjust CBDC interest rates either up or down. 
Some central banks seem to already find themselves in this situation, where the 
commitment to parity has stifled their opportunity for sovereign monetary policy. 
The implementation of CBDC together with both cash and bank money would 
not relieve but probably rather intensify this deadlock. Just like one of the solu-
tions to the conventional policy trilemma is to leave the monetary policy initia-
tive to competing money makers in the form of a foreign central bank, the com-
mitment to parity in the domestic monetary policy trilemma leaves the monetary 
policy initiative to competing money makers in the form of commercial banks. 
This is a theme that we shall be further expanding on in the following section. 
The conclusion to the current section is that even if the Swedish Riksbank or 
another central bank decides to afford money users a maximum availability of 
payment and money options by designing a system where CBDC co-exists with 
both cash and bank money, it may find itself having to pay the price of not being 
able to use monetary policy for anything else than defending the parity between 
the three kinds of money. 
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The Money Manager Scenario 
CBDC as Universal Reserves 
In the extreme, a DL [distributed ledger] for everyone could open the possi-
bility of creating a central bank digital currency. On some levels this is ap-
pealing. For example it would mean people have direct access to the ulti-
mate risk-free asset. In its extreme form, it could fundamentally and perhaps 
abruptly reshape banking. However, were it to co-exist with the current 
banking model, it could exacerbate liquidity risk by lowering the frictions 
involved in running to central bank money. These questions and others are 
why these topics are being examined as part of the Bank’s research agenda, 
with the prospect of a central bank digital currency for the UK, in my view, 
still some way off. We will work to make payments easier, and though cash 
may no longer be the king it once was, its reign will endure for some time. 
(Carney 2016, 8–9) 
This quote is from a speech by the Governor of the Bank of England, Mark 
Carney.  While Carney raises some of the same issues that we have seen in the 
speech by Skingsley, the quote is also suited to illustrate a slightly different type 
of concerns regarding the implementation of CBDC. 
Carney refers to CBDC as 'the ultimate risk-free asset'. This conception gives 
primacy to the function of money as a store of value. Having noted how 'direct 
access' to this kind of money is 'appealing' to the ordinary money user in the 
form of the 'people', he shifts the perspective to point out how the co-existence of 
CBDC and bank money would pose a risk to the current banking model. If mon-
ey users are given the option to choose between holding electronic money in the 
central bank and in a commercial bank they may, in other words, choose the 
former since CBDC is a superior store of value. While other parts of Carney's 
speech also include other perspectives on CBDC, this particular passage repre-
sents the concerns of the money manager. For the money users, access to risk-free 
CBDC increase their scope of choice, convenience and security, but for money 
managers such as commercial banks, CBDC constitutes competition and a threat 
to their business model. It is from this latter perspective that universally accessi-
ble CBDC appears to be 'extreme' since it might 'abruptly reshape banking.' 
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In the scenario proposed by Skingsley, CBDC is complementary to both cash 
and bank deposit money. Carney is much less explicit about this but his juxtapo-
sition between CBDC as being 'still some way off' and the prediction that the 
'reign' of cash 'will    endure for some time' seems to suggest that the two are 
conceived as alternatives. This is also how we may interpret the following quote 
from a speech by Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy at the Bank of England, 
Ben Broadbent: 
As far as its economic effects are concerned, my guess is that much would 
depend on how exactly a central bank digital currency (CBDC) is designed – 
and in particular the extent to which it competes with the main form of 
money in the economy, commercial bank deposits. As individuals, we al-
ready have the ability to hold claims on the central bank, in the form of 
physical cash. If all a CBDC did was to substitute for cash – if it bore no in-
terest and came without any of the extra services we get with bank accounts 
– people would probably still want to keep most of their money in commer-
cial banks. (Broadbent 2016, 3) 
In addition to the positioning of CBDC as a 'substitute for cash', it is also 
worth remarking the prediction that money users would still keep their money in 
the bank if CBDC came without interest and 'extra services'. Given the current 
situation, where commercial bank deposit rates are close to if not outright zero 
and a substantial part of bank profits are derived from fees accrued from custom-
ers, it seems rather optimistic to base monetary policy on such a prediction. An 
alternative scenario is that when conventional banks lose their monopoly on the 
issuance of electronic money, the banking sector would be unbundled and banks 
would find themselves in even competition with peer-to-peer lending companies, 
unconventional payment service providers and other non-bank businesses in the 
provision of 'extra services' to money users (see Ketterer et al. 2016). 
As we have discussed previously, the money manager perspective is associated 
with the credit theory of money that explains how money is created when bank's 
issue new loans. In Broadbent's speech, we find a concern about CBDC that is 
derived from some version of this theory of money:  
[T]aking deposits away from banks could impair their ability to make the 
loans in the first place. Banks would be more reliant on wholesale markets, a 
source of funding that didn’t prove particularly stable during the crisis, and 
could reduce their lending to the real economy as a result. 
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This is the really main point I want to get across. Some suggest that central 
banks will have to issue their own digital currency – i.e. to supply central 
bank money more widely, via some generalised distributed ledger – to meet 
a “competitive threat” from private-sector rivals. I suspect a more important 
issue for central banks considering such a move will be what it might mean 
for the funding of banks and the supply of credit. (Broadbent 2016, 3) 
The concern here is that the implementation of CBDC would impair the 
commercial bank's ability to create new money and lend it into 'the real econo-
my'. While this concern is clearly valid, it is worth considering whether the prob-
lem is one of the supply of money, as suggested by Broadbent, or perhaps rather 
one of demand for money. Before delving further into this question, we shall con-
ceptualize the concerns of the money manager in terms of the monetary policy 
trilemma.  
 
Making Good Money Worse 
From the money manager perspective, the prospect of CBDC being 'still some 
way off' thus provides some degree of comfort. It allows the banks to maintain 
their current business model and it allows the central bank to stick with option C 
in the policy trilemma. But if CBDC were to be implemented, the concerns of the 
money manager could be partially met by using it as an opportunity to phase out 
cash. This would effectively move the zero lower bound, which is currently pre-
venting interest rates from moving far into negative territory. Such line of rea-
soning is illustrated by the following quote from Chief Economist at the Bank of 
England, Andrew Haldane:  
One interesting solution, then, would be to maintain the principle of a gov-
ernment-backed currency, but have it issued in an electronic rather than pa-
per form. This would preserve the social convention of a state-issued unit of 
account and medium of exchange, albeit with currency now held in digital 
rather than physical wallets. But it would allow negative interest rates to be 
levied on currency easily and speedily, so relaxing the ZLB [Zero Lower 
Bound] constraint. (Haldane 2015, 11) 
In the previous section, we have already seen how the co-existence of CBDC 
and bank money forces the central bank to dedicate all of its monetary policy to 
the maintenance of parity by keeping an interest margin between CBDC and 
bank money corresponding to the difference in their perceived credit risk (option 
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A). The implementation of CBDC as a substitute for cash expands the scope of 
monetary policy since money users no longer have an interest free option to hold 
money. Cash is the weakest link in the central bank line of defense of parity. 
With cash removed, the central bank is now able to combat bank runs by in-
creasing negative interest rates on CBDC. This removes the risk of 'bad' com-
mercial bank deposit money driving out 'good' central bank reserve money since 
the central bank can always make CBDC 'worse' than bank money.  
From the money manager perspective, this design model also opens up addi-
tional prospects. There are the immediate benefits of saving some operational 
costs from not having to handle cash, which has to be taken in and paid out to 
customers. Along similar lines, banks would also have to worry less about bank 
robberies if there was no cash to rob. But a much more significant prospect has 
to do with increasing revenue rather than just saving costs. In the current envi-
ronment of low interest rates, it is difficult for commercial banks to make a profit 
on the interest spread between deposits and loans. If the central bank is willing 
to increase negative interest rates on CBDC, it opens up the space for banks to 
push this development and thus to make money not only by charging interests on 
loans but also charging negative interest rates on deposits. They can, in other 
words, innovate their business model by not only making money from borrowers 
but also from depositors.  
Charging negative interest rates on either bank money or CBDC is essentially 
a form of money destruction. If the central bank imposes a 5 percent negative 
interest rate on CBDC it is decreasing the supply of CBDC by 5 percent per 
year. A scenario, where the central bank is forced to charge negative interest 
rates on CBDC in order to defend parity with bank money, it is thus essentially 
destroying CBDC held by money users to maintain the commercial banks' ability 
to create new bank money. 
 
Money Supply or Money Demand  
When Barrdear and Kumhof of the Bank of England define CBDC as 'a cen-
tral bank ... granting universal ... access to its balance sheet' (see previous quote) 
they are only referring to the liability side of the central bank balance sheet. 
CBDC allows money users to hold the liabilities of the central bank, which puts 
them on par with banks. Today, however, banks are not only privileged by hav-
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ing access to the liability side of central bank balance sheets. They also enjoy a 
privileged access to the asset side of central bank balance sheet in so far as they 
have the exclusive right to initiate the buying or selling of financial securities in 
exchange for central bank reserve money. This typically happens through so-
called repurchase agreements or repos. The most usual form of security to be 
traded between central banks and commercial banks is government bonds. When 
commercial banks are net-sellers of financial securities to the central bank, the 
supply of central bank reserve money is increased. This is what happens in ordi-
nary open market operations and in more extreme measures in Quantitative Eas-
ing. An implementation of CBDC with universal access to the liability side of 
central bank balance sheets immediately raises the question if all money users 
should also have the opportunity to initiate an increase in the supply of CBDC 
by demanding to sell securities to the central bank. The question is, in other 
words, if universal access to the central bank balance sheet should be extended to 
the asset side. 
There are three general options of how to design a CBDC model with regards 
to this question: 1) Only banks are granted the opportunity to exchange CBDC 
for financial securities with the central bank. This is the way it already works 
with central bank reserve money today. 2) All money users are granted the op-
portunity to buy and sell CBDC for financial securities at the central bank. 3) 
The central bank refrains from expanding or contracting the money supply 
through open market selling or purchasing of financial securities and no one is 
granted the opportunity to trade directly with the central bank. The choice be-
tween these three different designs is no insignificant matter. It has profound 
implications for the management of the supply of money. The fundamental ques-
tion in this regard is whether the size of the total amount of money in the econ-
omy shall be determined by demand or supply. 
We normally refer to the amount of money in the economy as the 'money 
supply'. In the context of our current money system, this concept is misleading 
as money today is created in response to the demand for credit. Since banks can 
create new money by expanding their balance sheets, only under very special 
circumstances are they constrained by supply. When potential borrowers are re-
jected it is rarely due to a lack of money but rather because they are not regard-
ed as credit worthy by the bank. It would thus be more appropriate to speak of 
the 'money demand' rather than the 'money supply'. 
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If CBDC is designed according to the perspective of the money manager, 
banks would maintain their exclusive privilege to trade securities for central bank 
money directly with the central bank. The central bank creates CBDC in re-
sponse to demands from commercial banks requesting to buy CBDC. Commercial 
banks in turn respond to demands from money users wanting to hold CBDC in-
stead of bank account money or cash. Commercial banks thus retain their role as 
the first creators of new money through their lending activity, which is deter-
mined by the demand for credit in the economy. Once the aggregate supply of 
money has been expanded by the commercial banks, its composition of CBDC 
and bank account money may be altered by the preferences of the money users. 
When commercial banks purchase CBDC from the central bank to meet demands 
from customers, it does not change the aggregate supply of money. When a bank 
pays out an amount of CBDC to a customer it simultaneously cancels out an 
equivalent amount of bank account money. If, however, the commercial bank 
purchases CBDC from the central bank and holds this money itself instead of 
paying it out to customers, it would amount to an increase in the supply of mon-
ey. In essence, CBDC would be introduced into the economy in similar fashion as 
cash is supplied today. 
At first sight it might seem as if such a model would put restrictions on the 
commercial banks' capacity to provide credit and lending into the economy. This 
was also the concern raised by Broadbent in the above. Since banks are obliged 
to meet money users' demand for conversion of bank money into CBDC, they 
have to make sure that  their stock of CBDC or at least their stock of liquid se-
curities that are easily convertible into CBDC, is large enough to meet such a 
potential demand. If banks do not have enough CBDC they could be forced to 
reject potential borrowers. 
This concern, however, rests on confusion between supply and demand. If cen-
tral banks are committed to the maintenance of parity they are eo ipso also 
committed to the provision of enough CBDC to meet money users' demand for 
conversion of bank money into CBDC. If banks do not have enough CBDC on 
their balance sheet to meet demands for conversion, they simply just turn to the 
central bank and exchange some of their assets for CBDC. The creation of bank 
money and credit is not restricted by supply and thus 'taking deposits away from 
banks' does not, as suggested by Broadbent, 'impair their ability to make ... 
loans in the first place.' 
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This does not mean that the design model with CBDC and bank money is 
without problems. But the risk is not, that banks are unable to make enough 
bank money, but rather that they are incited to make too many. If banks retain 
the opportunity to increase the total money supply through their issuance of new 
credit while the composition of the money supply in terms of bank account mon-
ey, and CBDC is subsequently determined by the preferences of money users, the 
central bank may find itself faced with some difficult questions. In the aftermath 
of the financial crisis and under existing Quantitative Easing programs, central 
banks have increased the volume of open market operations and expanded their 
asset portfolio to comprise other kinds of securities than government bonds. This 
includes corporate bonds, mortgage bonds and even in some cases equity. Such 
increased engagement in financial markets has already posed a series of funda-
mental questions about the role and mandate of central banks: Which types of 
risks should a central bank take on? To what extent should it mobilize its bal-
ance sheet to interfere with the pricing of securities in the market? Should cen-
tral banks shield private banks from losses and default by absorbing risky assets? 
In a model, where CBDC is implemented as complementary to bank account 
money, these questions are going to become even more pressing and pertinent. 
If the central bank remains committed to supply whatever amount of CBDC 
is demanded first by money users and then by commercial banks, the central 
bank may ultimately find itself unable to decide, how many securities it wants to 
buy and hold. This is conceivable in a kind of digital bank run scenario, where 
money users decide that CBDC are more attractive than bank account money 
and they turn to their bank for conversion. In order to meet such demand, the 
bank turns to the central bank to exchange securities for CBDC. The central 
bank would have to accept this proposition and take on the role of 'buyer of last 
resort' in order to maintain financial stability. But what happens when the com-
mercial bank's stock of high-grade assets has been exhausted and money users' 
demand for CBDC is still not satisfied? The central bank may find itself taking 
over significant amounts of bad debts taken on by the banks. And how should 
the assets exchanged for CBDC be priced in the first place? 
The central bank is an atypical agent in the financial market: It is ultimately 
obliged to buy. It can create its own money. And it is not trading to make a 
profit. This means that its trading engagement will have profound effects on the 
pricing mechanisms of the market. This is already happening under current QE 
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schemes, which have the effect of inflating asset prices as central banks are seem-
ingly insatiable net buyers in the market. Furthermore, we have also seen central 
banks buying so-called 'troubled assets' from commercial banks as part of various 
bail-out schemes thus absorbing losses originally incurred by private corpora-
tions. An implementation of CBDC alongside bank account money will just exac-
erbate these effects. 
A further scenario is that commercial banks take advantage of the central 
bank's commitment to meet demands for CBDC by exchanging them for securi-
ties. We might see a repeat of the US mortgage crisis, where banks made a profit 
by extending excessive amounts of risky loans. These risks were then subsequent-
ly offloaded from the banks' balance sheet by being securitized and sold. Rather 
than selling such securities to unknowing investors, which happened in the build 
up to the crisis, the banks may now simply sell them to the central bank in ex-
change for CBDC. 
Several central banks are currently engaged in QE schemes. These schemes are 
supply driven in the sense that the central banks decide the amount of new re-
serve money that they want to supply to the banking system by purchasing fi-
nancial assets. In a money system with CBDC circulating alongside bank account 
money, central banks may find themselves in demand driven QE schemes, where 
the amount of new CBDC to be supplied is determined by demands from com-
mercial banks and money users. The problem is not that banks have exclusive 
access to the asset side of the central bank balance sheet by being able to buy 
CBDC directly from the central bank. Expanding this access to all money users 
would merely exacerbate the problem. In the following, we shall be looking into a 
design model, where neither banks nor money users have access to this kind of 
direct exchange with the central bank. In this model, the money supply is thus 
truly driven by supply. 
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The Money Maker Scenario 
CBDC as Sovereign Account Money 
Money is an instrument of exerting power, comparable only to legal com-
mand power backed by force. The right to be a creator and first user of 
money gives power and privilege over all subsequent users. In modern socie-
ties as much as in traditional ones, such power and privilege must not be 
private, but a sovereign prerogative, preferably under conditions of separa-
tion of powers and the liberal rule of law.  
Control of the money of a realm has always been an element of sovereign 
rule, much as lawmaking, the judiciary, taxation and the use of force. The 
monetary prerogative includes the sovereign rights of determining the cur-
rency (a country’s monetary unit of account), creating the money denomi-
nated in that currency (the official means of payment), and benefiting from 
the seigniorage thereof by spending or lending the money and thus releasing 
it into circulation. The constitutional dimension of money must not be dis-
regarded, either in terms of legitimacy and state law, or in terms of econom-
ic functionality. (Huber 2017, 3)  
This is not a quote from a central banker but from Professor Joseph Huber, 
who is one of the first advocates of the idea of central banks creating digital cash 
(Huber and Robertson 2000). The quote illustrates an approach to money and 
money creation, which is structured by legal concerns regarding sovereignty and 
legitimacy. In this approach, the creation of money is ultimately a constitutional 
matter (see also Binswanger, Huber, and Mastronardi 2012; Huber 2014). This 
implies that the creation of the nation's money supply is a prerogative of the 
sovereign state. 
In the first sentence of his book, Huber writes: 'This book aims to make peo-
ple aware of the central position the monetary system occupies in today's highly 
monetarized and financialized economies' (Huber 2017, 1). In contrast to Skings-
ley's invocation of 'the general public' as money users, which we encountered 
previously, Huber addresses 'people' as citizens of a democratic state with a legit-
imate interest in the constitution of the monetary system. The purpose of the 
implementation of CBDC, according to Huber, is to reinstate the central bank as 
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the sovereign money maker. In so far as the central bank is a public institution, 
it is the representative of the people. Huber is thus ultimately addressing people 
as money makers. 
According to Huber, monetary sovereignty includes: 
1. Determining the currency of the realm, the common unit of account 
2. Creating and issuing the money, the regular official means of payment 
denominated in that currency, and 
3. Taking the benefit from money creation, the seigniorage. (Huber 2017, 
144) 
The order of this list is not accidental. The determination of the currency is 
the most important as it is the prerequisite for the second point, which is the 
prerequisite for the third. The list thus foregrounds the function of money as unit 
of account. Huber's understanding of our current money system partly relies on 
the credit theory, which we also found in the money manager perspective. At the 
same time, Huber insists that the credit theory should be combined with the 
state theory in order to understand, how banks can only create money as long as 
the state allows their credit to count as the unit of account (Huber 2017, 92–97). 
As we have seen, this happens first and foremost as the state accepts bank mon-
ey in the payment of taxes. This institutes bank money as a concrete unit of ac-
count of the currency. 
For Huber the state theory of money is not only applicable in the analysis of 
the money system. It also serves as a normative theory about the way that the 
money system ought to function. The key feature of the CBDC design model, 
which follows from the money maker perspective, is the abolition of bank credit 
as money. In this model, there is a complete identity between the entity, which is 
responsible for the abstract unit of account, and the entity, which is the creator 
of the concrete unit of account. While banks would retain their ability to create 
credit, just like any other business or individual in the economy, there would be 
no state or central bank guarantee that this credit counts as money and circu-
lates at par in the economy. 
The CBDC design model of the money maker scenario solves the monetary 
policy trilemma by abandoning the responsibility to maintain parity between 
central bank money and commercial bank money. This is solution (B) in the tri-
angle. In return, the central bank regains monetary sovereignty and the oppor-
tunity to use monetary policy for other purposes than providing support for the 
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creation of bank money. Dyson and Hodgson from the UK monetary reform or-
ganization, Positive Money, provides a list of such opportunities including the 
provision of fiscal stimulus to the non-financial economy through money creation 
(Helicopter Money) and public recapture of seigniorage profits (Dyson and Hodg-
son 2016, 6–14). 
 
Integration of Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
The most immediate consequence of the implementation of a CBDC design 
model without bank money would be a tremendous simplification of the mone-
tary system. Many of the questions and challenges that would have to be ad-
dressed and solved in a model where CBDC and bank money co-exist simply van-
ishes. 
First, the money supply would actually become a money supply. As we have 
seen, the total stock of money under the current monetary system is best referred 
to as the 'money demand', since it is governed by demand and only in extreme 
cases restricted by supply. In a CBDC design model without bank money, the 
central bank would be the only source of the supply of money and would thus be 
in a sovereign position to increase or decrease the stock of money by adjusting 
the supply. 
Second, central bank monetary policy would no longer have to rely on the as-
sumption of an indirect causality between central bank reserve interest rate ad-
justments and commercial bank money creation, which is assumed to be mediat-
ed by complex transmission effects. In a CBDC design model without bank mon-
ey, the payment of interests on CBDC deposits would effectively be money crea-
tion. When the central bank credits the CBDC accounts of money users, because 
they have accrued interests, it simply creates money. Should the central bank 
decide to impose negative interest rates on CBDC, the debiting of these interests 
would amount to a destruction of money. The payment or collection of positive 
or negative interests on CBDC is, in other words, one of the channels through 
which the central bank can increase or decrease the money supply. 
Third, the distinction between monetary and fiscal policy interventions in the 
economy would disappear. The implementation of CBDC without bank money 
does not necessarily mean that the current institutional division between deci-
sions on monetary policy and fiscal policy is abandoned (Huber 2017, 146–51; 
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Jackson and Dyson 2012, 203–10). Decisions on how much money should be cre-
ated could still be made by an independent central bank on the basis of a certain 
monetary policy mandate. And decisions on how to spend newly created money 
would still be made by an elected parliament based on fiscal policy preferences. 
The novelty is that the even monetary policy decisions made by the central bank 
would have immediate fiscal implications. If the central bank pays interest on 
CBDC it is effectively paying a kind of social benefit to money holders. If it 
charges negative interest rates on CBDC it is levying a tax on money. Besides 
interests on CBDC there are a number of other channels through which the cen-
tral bank can introduce new CBDC into the economy (Huber 2017, 160–63; Jack-
son and Dyson 2012, 211–18). If its monetary policy mandate requires an expan-
sion of the money supply, the central bank can simply credit the treasury's 
CBDC account and thus make new money available for public investment and 
spending. The central bank can also simply credit the CBDC accounts of all citi-
zens in the country with an equal amount. Since new CBDC is in both of these 
cases immediately distributed to money users, it is impossible to distinguish be-
tween their monetary and fiscal policy effects. 
Fourth, the decision on whom to allow the privilege of exchanging financial 
assets for CBDC directly with the central bank has much less significance for 
monetary policy. In addition to the above mentioned channels for the introduc-
tion of new CBDC into the economy, the central bank could also make an 
amount of new CBDC available for banks and other financial intermediaries to 
borrow, who are then able to expand their lending into the economy. This would 
probably remain a more pure form of monetary policy intervention. In contrast 
to the CBDC design model with bank money, the central bank is now in a much 
better position to make a sovereign decision on how much new money it wants to 
lend into the economy and then subsequently decide to whom it wants to lend 
and what kind of assets it will accept as collateral. Since the central bank is no 
longer compelled to defend parity, commercial banks are no longer in a position 
to drive the money supply through a demand for conversion of financial securities 
into CBDC. 
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What about Cash? 
As introduced already in section three, the money maker scenario branches off 
into two different design models: 3) CBDC as a replacement for both cash and 
bank money, or 4) CBDC as complimentary to cash and a replacement for bank 
money. The first thing to note in the comparison between these two models is 
that the abandonment of bank money and the relinquishment of the central bank 
responsibility for parity reconfigure the question of cash. In a CBDC design mod-
el with bank money, the existence of cash stands in the way of negative interest 
rates and thus curbs the central bank's ability to defend parity in situations with 
widespread mistrust in the commercial banking sector. This is what Huber is 
hinting at in the following:  
Irritatingly, what central bankers seem to have in mind when reflecting on 
alternatives to traditional solid cash is the questionable aim of imposing 
without hindrance negative interest rather than worrying about monetary 
sovereignty. (Huber 2017, 189) 
In a design model without bank money, the central bank has regained mone-
tary sovereignty and is no longer forced to use interest rates or other monetary 
policy tools to maintain private bank money creation. Hence, the abolition of 
cash has no significant implications for the relation between the central bank and 
the commercial banks. 
In turn, what is at stake in the question of cash is the relation between the 
central bank and the money users. This brings us back to the kinds of concerns 
raised in the money user scenario including issues of privacy, anonymity, security 
in crisis situations, and financial inclusion. The option to choose between holding 
cash and holding CBDC provides some measure of freedom and power to money 
users in their relation with the central bank. Even if the central bank is no longer 
compelled to defend parity between CBDC and bank money, it may still find it 
convenient to impose negative interest rates on CBDC. The existence of cash 
would again constitute some measure of restraint on this option. 
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Conclusion: Mint, Print and Type 
It is difficult to predict, which central bank is going to be the first to issue its 
own digital currency. As we have seen, the Swedish Riksbank seems to be one of 
the most progressive central banks in this respect. There is a certain historical 
curiosity to this fact. 
In 1661 the first version of modern paper bank notes was issued by Stockholm 
Banco. The bank was privately owned but operated under a royal charter. The 
paper notes of the Stockholm Banco, kreditivsedlar as they were called, were 
initially backed by deposits of copper and subsequently silver but once the notes 
began to circulate as immediate means of payment, the bank was able to issue 
them not only against deposits of metal coins but also as loans. A combination of 
excessive money creation in excess of metal deposits and fluctuating metal prices 
due to import of foreign copper caused the system to collapse and the Stockholm 
Banco to enter into liquidation in 1664. After the liquidation, the bank was taken 
over by the Swedish state in 1668, which is the point that the contemporary 
Riksbank today recognizes as its foundation. 
The history of the kreditivsedlar and the Stockholm Banco is a story about 
the way that modern central banking emerged as a response to the invention of a 
new kind of money. The challenge posed by this new kind of money was of course 
that the production of paper money is not restricted by the availability of pre-
cious metals otherwise required to mint coins. There was a need for new laws and 
institutions to govern the issuance of money. In several other European countries 
we thus find similar stories about the way that national central banks were 
founded in the 17th, 18th and 19th century to administer the printing of money. 
The contemporary question of CBDC is in many ways analogous to the histor-
ical questions of the birth of paper money. In the 20th century we have seen the 
invention of a new kind of money: electronic money. Just like the evolution of 
paper money in its time, the innovation of electronic means of payment has in-
deed made our economies more efficient and convenient and enabled entirely new 
forms of economic interaction. The introduction and proliferation of electronic 
money has, however, also introduced entirely new forms of risk and instability in 
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the economy, which are also comparable to the ones brought about by paper 
money. The question of 21st century monetary policy is how to respond to these 
new forms of risk and instability. 
The three scenarios for the implementation of CBDC are summarized in table 
2: 
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Table 2: Summary of CBDC scenarios 
 Money User Scenario Money Manager Scenario Money Maker Scenario 
Definition Electronic Cash Universal Reserves Sovereign Account Money 
Perspective Consumer Bank Citizen 
Function Medium of exchange Store of value Unit of account 
Design Complimentary to cash and 
bank money 
Complimentary to bank money 
and replacement for cash 
Replacement for bank money 
with or without cash 
Supply Demand driven. Central bank 
supplies CBDC in response to 
demand from commercial 
banks, who respond to demand 
from customers wanting to 
hold CBDC instead of cash or 
bank money. 
Demand driven. Central bank 
supplies CBDC in response to 
demand from banks, who 
respond to demand from cus-
tomers wanting to hold CBDC 
instead of bank money. 
Supply driven. Central bank 
supplies CBDC in accordance 
with monetary policy goals. 
New CBDC are transferred to 
the Treasury or directly to 
money users. 
Exchange Commercial banks have privi-
lege to sell financial assets in 
exchange for CBDC at the 
central bank. 
Commercial banks have privi-
lege to sell financial assets in 
exchange for CBDC at the 
central bank. 
Commercial banks must ac-
quire CBDC in the open mar-
ket on par with all other mon-
ey users. All money users can 
exchange cash for CBDC at 
the central bank. 
Parity Central bank has responsibility 
for parity between CBDC, cash 
and bank money. 
Central bank has responsibility 
for parity between CBDC and 
bank money. 
Central bank has responsibility 
for parity between CBDC and 
cash. Commercial banks have 
responsibility for the price of 
any of their liabilities relative 
to CBDC. 
Interest CBDC carry interest, which 
may go into negative although 
the existence of cash sets a de 
facto lower bound 
CBDC carry interest, which 
may go into negative. This 
interest rate is used as a mone-
tary policy tool to defend 
parity 
CBDC may or may not carry 
interest.  Money creation is the 
primary monetary policy tool. 
Interests are just a way of 
creating new money or de-
stroying existing money. 
Seigniorage Central bank (treasury) earns 
opportunity cost seigniorage on 
CBDC and cash. Commercial 
banks earn opportunity cost 
seigniorage on bank money.  
Central bank (treasury) earns 
opportunity cost seigniorage on 
CBDC. Commercial banks 
earn opportunity cost seignior-
age on bank money. The pos-
sibility of negative interest
rates may increase opportuni-
ties for seigniorage. 
Central bank (treasury) earns 
monetary seigniorage on 
CBDC. 
Politics Add efficiency to existing 
system 
Save existing system Reform existing system 
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The scenarios not only differ in terms of the kind of solutions they provide. 
They also differ by their inherent identification of the challenge that needs to be 
addressed. This is what the final row of the table refers to. 
The challenge identified in the money user scenario is largely a matter of user 
functionality. The responsibility of the central bank is to make sure that money 
functions optimally as a medium of exchange. The purpose of implementing 
CBDC is thus merely to add efficiency and functionality to the existing monetary 
system. 
The challenge identified in the money manager scenario is slightly more se-
vere. There is a risk that existing bank money shall become unable to perform 
their function as store of value. The business model of existing banks is under 
threat by financial instability on the one hand and fintech innovation on the oth-
er. The purpose of implementing CBDC is to provide central banks with better 
tools to defend the existing money and banking system. 
The challenge identified in the money maker scenario is again a much more 
comprehensive political problem about sovereignty. Having largely relinquished 
the prerogative to create money, state monetary authorities have abandoned the 
most important tool to subject the economy to democratic control. The purpose 
of implementing CBDC is to reform the system by updating the traditional cen-
tral bank monopoly on paper money to the digital age. 
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